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A Multidimensional Analysis of What Not to Wear in 
the Workplace: Hijabs and Natural Hair 
D. Wendy Greene* 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
This article challenges a relatively universal judicial and societal 
assumption that employers’ enactment and enforcement of grooming 
codes are inconsequential to women’s access to, and inclusion in, 
American workplaces.  Specifically, this article provides a multidimen-
sional analysis of workplace grooming codes, shedding light on the 
comparable journeys of Black1 and Muslim women whose hair and 
hair coverings are subject to employer regulation. This article attempts 
to fill a gap at the intersection of race, religion, and gender within the 
scholarly literature examining workplace grooming codes, which de-
prive and tend to deprive women of color employment opportunities 
for which they are qualified.   In doing so, I acknowledge that Black 
and Muslim identities are not mutually exclusive, as those who identi-
fy as Black or African descendant may also be Muslim.  Further, this 
                                                                                                                           
 * Professor of Law and Director of Faculty Development, Cumberland School of Law at 
Samford University. I am indebted to the FIU Law Review and Professor Kerri Stone for the 
invitation to participate in this wonderful symposium in addition to the law review editorial 
board for their unwavering professionalism, patience, and assistance throughout. Enormous 
thanks to: Ashley Rhea (Class of 2014) for outstanding research assistance and insightful dia-
logue throughout the development of this article; Khaula Hadeed (Class of 2014) for her genuine 
engagement in and encouragement of this project; and Professor Deleso Alford for her construc-
tive feedback on this and related articles. As always, I am grateful for my parents, family, and 
friends for their abiding love and support in all that I do. This article is written in the spirit of 
sisterhood; for, we are our sisters’ keepers. 
 1 Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw has explained that “Black” deserves capitalization be-
cause “Blacks like Asians [and] Latinos . . . constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, re-
quire denotation as a proper noun.”  Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrench-
ment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 
n.2 (1988) (citing Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and State: An Agenda 
for Theory, 7 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC’Y 515, 516 (1982)).  Additionally, Professor 
Neil Gotanda contends that the capitalization of Black is appropriate as it “has deep political 
and social meaning as a liberating term.”  Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is 
Colorblind”, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 n.12 (1991).  I agree with both Professors Crenshaw and 
Gotanda, and for both reasons, throughout this Article when I reference people of African de-
scent individually and collectively the word, Black, will be represented as a proper noun. 
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article in no way purports that the experience of Muslim women and 
Black women is a monolith, nor does it project that the course for 
Muslim women who choose to wear a hijab2 and Black women who 
choose to don a natural hairstyle is identical in the workplace and be-
yond.  
This article simply aims to illuminate how these women, who are 
racialized as non-white due to their physical appearance and/or their 
religious faith and observances, share similar experiences as it relates 
to workplace inclusion and exclusion vis à vis what adorns their heads. 
Indeed, workplace prohibitions against Black women’s natural hair-
styles and Muslim women’s donning of a hijab are closely aligned 
forms of race and gender-based discrimination, triggering parallel ac-
tual as well as perceived stigmatization, vulnerability, and exclusion 
for these women of color, which civil rights constituencies have not 
fully exposed or addressed. First, Part II briefly details the prohibi-
tions against private workplace discrimination under Title VII of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act, and delineates the need for a multidimensional 
analysis of grooming codes banning and limiting hijabs and natural 
hairstyles in the workplace.  In so doing, this article draws upon the 
works of notable critical race and sexuality theorists in its contention 
that a “multidimensional” analysis of the discrimination that women 
of color as a collective experience in the workplace—at the intersec-
tion of race, religion, and gender—is vital for a deeper understanding 
of the civil rights issues at stake, as well as for increased and sustained 
civil rights advocacy challenging the legality of such grooming codes. 
Part III examines a recent Title VII case decided by the Third 
Circuit involving three Muslim women’s unsuccessful challenge 
against their employer’s “no headgear” policy in EEOC v. Geo Group 
Incorporated.  Next, this article compares GEO Group to the seminal 
Title VII case involving Black women’s challenge to an employer’s 
prohibition against braided hairstyles in Rogers v. American Airlines 
and its progeny, namely Pitts v. Wild Adventures: a braids case decided 
over thirty years after Rogers.  Part III synthesizes management and 
judicial responses in GEO Group, Rogers, and Pitts.  This Part demon-
strates the ways in which management effectuates a particular gender 
subordination, stigmatization, and exclusion via its enactment and 
enforcement of grooming policies against Black and Muslim women.  
This Part also illustrates the resulting vulnerability, disempowerment, 
and difference in treatment, terms, conditions, and privileges of em-
ployment that Black and Muslim women encounter due to manage-
                                                                                                                           
 2 Throughout this article, I refer to Muslim women’s head coverings interchangeably as a 
hijab, khimar, and headscarf.  
2013] A Multidimensional Analysis on What Not to Wear 335 
ment responses to their hair-related decisions and judicial legitimati-
zation of these responses.  
Part IV provides a multidimensional analysis of the legal protec-
tion for the donning of hijabs and natural hairstyles in private work-
places as well as its socio-political and personal meaning for Muslim 
and Black women.  Accordingly, this Part situates employer appear-
ance codes affecting Black and Muslim women within a broader social 
context.  Part IV also elucidates unifying and distinctive threads 
amongst Black and Muslim women who don natural hairstyles and 
hijabs.  Lastly, Part V proposes that the meaning of Title VII’s plain 
language and cross-coalitional advocacy should be enhanced so that 
antidiscrimination law and doctrine can meaningfully attend to the 
deprivation of equal employment opportunities for Black and Muslim 
women, which oft goes under-discussed in our civil rights discourse 
and unredressed within our discrimination frameworks.   
II.  RELIGIOUS, SEX, AND RACE DISCRIMINATION IN THE PRIVATE 
WORKPLACE  
A. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act expressly prohibits covered 
employers from discriminating against individuals on the basis of race, 
religion, sex, national origin, and color.3 Expressly, section 703(a) of 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act makes it unlawful for employers  
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or other-
wise discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because 
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely 
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.4 
                                                                                                                           
 3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2000). 
 4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2000). Where an employment practice is facially discrim-
inatory on the basis of sex, religion, or national origin, the employer can escape Title VII liability 
by demonstrating the employment practice is a “bona fide occupational qualification reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(e) (2000). Where the employment practice is not expressly discriminatory, a plaintiff may 
prove unlawful discrimination either through direct or circumstantial evidence. Desert Palace, 
Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003). Though not mandatory, when analyzing circumstantial 
cases of intentional discrimination, the vast majority of courts apply the burden-shifting frame-
work promulgated by the Supreme Court: a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case that raises 
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The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted section 703(a) as prohibiting 
not only intentional discrimination,5 but also unintentional discrimina-
tion6 on the enumerated proscribed grounds.  Generally, Black wom-
en’s challenges against workplace grooming code barring natural hair-
styles have been theorized as a hybrid form of intentional and unin-
tentional discrimination or simply as a form of intentional discrimina-
tion.7  These grooming codes cases are analyzed through alternative 
theoretical constructs; the grooming codes are: discriminatory on their 
face; unequally burdensome or disproportionately impactful to Black 
women; and/or unlawfully motivated by race and/or gender though 
facially neutral policies.  
Generally, Title VII religious-based challenges against grooming 
codes have been analyzed under an accommodation framework that 
does not necessarily consider the employer’s intentionality in enacting 
the appearance mandates.8  Title VII defines religion as inclusive of 
“all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, un-
less an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably ac-
commodate to an employee’s . . . religious observance or practice 
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”9  
Accordingly, a covered employer also violates Title VII’s prohibition 
against religious discrimination if it fails to make good faith efforts to 
reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious observance, prac-
tice, and belief that conflicts with an employment requirement of 
                                                                                                                           
a presumption of unlawful discrimination; the defendant rebuts this presumption by articulating 
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason; and to satisfy her burden of production and persuasion, a 
discrimination plaintiff must produce persuasive evidence that the employer’s asserted reason is 
either false and/or that the employer’s underlying motivation for the adverse employment action 
was more likely than not a discriminatory reason. See generally McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792 (1973); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981); Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).   
 5  See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1970) (holding that “Congress directed 
the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation”) 
(emphasis in original). In 1991, Congress codified the disparate impact theory, which permits 
Title VII plaintiffs to succeed on claims of unintentional discrimination by demonstrating that an 
employment practice disproportionately impacted a protected group and an alternative practice 
with a less discriminatory impact existed which the employer refused to implement—even if the 
employer demonstrates that the challenged employment practice is job related and consistent 
with business necessity. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)–(C) (2000). 
 6 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1970).   
 7 See, e.g., Rogers v. Am. Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also Jenkins v. Blue 
Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1976); McManus v. MCI Commc’n. Corp, 748 
A.2d 949 (2000); Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Inc., No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306, at *4-6 
(M.D. Ga. Apr. 25, 2008). 
 8  See, e.g., EEOC v. Alamo Rent-a-Car, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (D. Ariz. 2006); EEOC v. 
Kelly Serv., 598 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2010); EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 
2d 1272 (N.D. Okla. 2011). 
 9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). 
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which the employer is aware.10  The employer is not required to im-
plement the employee’s proposed accommodation;11 an employer 
meets its statutory obligation when it offers any reasonable accom-
modation to the employee.12  However, an employer is not obligated to 
accommodate an employee’s religious observance, practice, or belief if 
an employer can demonstrate that the proposed accommodation is 
unreasonable or that it would incur an undue hardship in doing so.13  
Yet, an employer’s claims of undue hardship14 must be real and not 
speculative.15  
This article’s subsequent examination of EEOC v. The GEO 
Group, Rogers v. American Airlines, and Pitts v. Wild Adventures 
evinces a particular experience under the law that Black and Muslim 
women may face when private employers regulate what they can and 
cannot adorn on their heads in the workplace—irrespective of the 
legal framework applied to their discrimination claims.  By examining 
these Title VII cases initiated by both Black and Muslim women, one 
can better appreciate unifying concerns and encounters for women of 
color whose hair and head coverings are expressly deemed violative of 
institutionalized workplace norms in light of the parallel ways in 
which employers and courts have responded to their claims of unlaw-
ful discrimination. Accordingly, these grooming codes cases demarcate 
the ways in which legal doctrine ensconces the prevailing cultural 
norm—gendered and racialized—which maintains exclusionary barri-
ers on the basis of religion, race, and gender the law was designed to 
eliminate. A multidimensional analysis of GEO Group, Rogers, and 
Pitts therefore illustrates the ways in which legal and social norms 
confine the privilege and freedom of a subset of working women of 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See Chambers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1020 (holding that an employer’s 
duty to accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs is triggered when an employer actually 
knows or should reasonably know that an employee’s religious beliefs conflict with an employ-
ment requirement).  
 11    See Ansonia Bd. of Ed. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 65-66 (1986). 
 12   Id. at 68. The employer is not required to adopt the employee’s proposed accommoda-
tion; to fulfill its statutory obligation the employer must simply propose any reasonable accom-
modation that resolves the employee’s religious conflict. See id.  
 13  An accommodation is unreasonable or imposes an undue hardship when it violates the 
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, a nondiscriminatory seniority system, engenders 
more than a de minimis (monetary or non-monetary) cost for the employer or results in differen-
tial treatment between employees. See id. at 71. See also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 
432 U.S. 63, 76-84 (1977). 
 14  See Brown v. Polk, 61 F.3d 650, 655 (8th Cir. 1995) (enumerating ways in which an em-
ployer can satisfy its burden of production and persuasion on the issue of undue hardship based 
upon Title VII precedent). 
 15  See Anderson v. Gen. Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div. 589 F.2d 397, 402 (9th Cir. 
1978). 
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color and leave them uniquely vulnerable to the imposition of dis-
criminatory grooming mandates by employers.  Thus, this article’s con-
current treatment of Muslim and Black women’s Title VII challenges 
against employer grooming mandates elucidates the limits of current 
antidiscrimination jurisprudence to effectuate substantive equality 
and inclusion in the workplace for women of color.  
B. Toward a Multidimensional Analysis of Workplace Grooming 
Codes that Regulate the Ways in which Women of Color Adorn 
Their Heads 
Elsewhere, I issued a call for renewed attention to and analyses 
of: unfettered racialized and gendered workplace grooming codes that 
regulate Black women’s hairstyles; attendant deprivation of Black 
women’s acquisition and maintenance of employment; and the result-
ing denial of civil rights protections against race and gender discrimi-
nation for Black women.16  This article builds upon yet broadens the 
scope of my previous scholarly investigation of appearance codes in 
that it illuminates the collective experience of Muslim and Black 
women subjected to workplace regulations of their hair.  In doing so, it 
provides a more nuanced and holistic perspective on this contempo-
rary civil rights issue by putting forth a “multidimensional” analysis of 
workplace grooming codes that ban the natural hairstyles and head 
coverings of women of color.  In its “multidimensional” examination 
of private employers’ regulations of Black and Muslim women’s hair, 
and their maintenance of gender-based exclusion, subordination, and 
stigmatization at the intersection of race and religion, namely, this ar-
ticle draws upon the theoretical insights of notable critical race and 
sexuality scholars, Professors Darren Hutchinson and Francisco Val-
des.17  As Professor Hutchinson explains, the notion of “multidimen-
sionality” within race-sex equality doctrine is an extension of a fun-
damental critical race theoretical intervention known as 
“intersectionality”—most notably advanced by Professor Kimberlé 
Crenshaw in her seminal article, Demarginalizing the Intersection of 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See D. Wendy Greene, Black Women Can’t Have Blonde Hair…in the Workplace, 14 J. 
GENDER, RACE & JUST. 405, 430 (2011). See also generally D. Wendy Greene, Title VII: What’s 
Hair (and Other Race-Based Characteristics) Got to Do With It?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1355 (2008) 
(hereinafter What’s Hair Got to Do With It). 
 17 See generally Francisco Valdes, Beyond Sexual Orientation in Queer Legal Theory: 
Majoritarianism, Multidisciplinary, and Responsibility in Social Justice Scholarship or Legal 
Scholars as Cultural Warriers, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1409, 1415 (1998); see also Darren Lenard 
Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: “Intersectionality,” “Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an 
Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285 (2001). 
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Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doc-
trine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics.18   
In Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, Professor 
Crenshaw delineates the lack of recognition of and remedy for the 
specific discrimination that Black women suffer due to the interaction 
between their race and gender within antidiscrimination doctrine be-
cause courts have conceived discrimination on the basis of race and 
gender as mutually exclusive concepts rather than mutually reinforc-
ing constructs.19  According to Crenshaw, in race and sex discrimina-
tion cases, courts ignore the “multidimensionality” of Black women 
and have viewed discrimination and subordination that Black women 
contend experiencing along a “single categorical axis.”20  Therefore, 
“the boundaries of sex and race discrimination doctrine are defined 
respectively by white women’s and Black men’s experiences.  Per this 
view, Black women are protected [under antidiscrimination law] only 
to the extent that their experiences coincide with the experiences of 
either of these two groups.”21  Such an essentialist concentration “on 
the [condition of the] most privileged group members,” i.e., white 
women or Black men, within antidiscrimination doctrine and jurispru-
dence according to Crenshaw, “marginalizes those who are multiply-
burdened and obscures claims that cannot be understood as resulting 
from discrete sources of discrimination.”22  Consequently, Professor 
Crenshaw specifically advocated for the deployment of an “intersec-
tional” framework within antidiscrimination doctrine as well as femi-
nist and anti-racist platforms which seeks to acknowledge and disman-
tle the particular forms of subordination that Black women experi-
ence as “Black women—not the sum of race and sex discrimination, 
but as Black women.”23 
In his article, Identity Crisis: “Intersectionality,” “Multidimension-
ality,” and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 
Professor Darren Hutchinson traces the evolution of intersectionality 
theory since Professor Crenshaw’s seminal work and explains that 
“post-intersectionality” theorists—for example, “race-sexuality critics, 
whose scholarship examines the relationships among racism, patriar-
chy, class domination, and heterosexism”24—have expanded the con-
                                                                                                                           
 18 Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 139 (1989). 
 19 See generally id. 
 20 Id. at 139-40. 
 21 Id. at 143. 
 22 Id. at 140. 
 23 Id. at 149. 
 24 Hutchinson, supra note 17, at 309.  
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tours of intersectionality theory to novel “substantive and conceptual 
terrains;”25 Professor Hutchinson’s and Professor Valdes’ notion of 
“multidimensionality” is one such analytical tool located within the 
evolutionary thread of intersectionality theory.  According to Profes-
sor Hutchinson, 
[m]ultidimensionality “recognize[s] the inherent complexity of 
systems of oppression . . . and the social identity categories 
around which social power and disempowerment are distribut-
ed.”  Multidimensionality posits that the various forms of identity 
and oppression are “inextricably and forever intertwined” and 
that essentialist equality theories “invariably reflect the experi-
ences of class- and race-privileged” individuals.  Multidimension-
ality, therefore, arises out of and is informed by intersectionality 
theory.26 
Professor Valdes further argues that multidimensional theory and 
praxis are needed for transformative social justice advocacy, as multi-
dimensionality 
reminds all outgroups that all forms of identity hierarchy impinge 
on the social and legal interests of their members: biases based 
on race/ethnicity, sex/gender, sexual orientation and other identi-
ty features are directly relevant to each of those overlapping 
groups' social and legal interests because all of those biases im-
pact members of every such group.  Multidimensionality tends to 
promote awareness of patterns as well as particularities in social 
relations by studying in an interconnected way the specifics of 
subordination.27 
Accordingly, though multidimensionality emanates from, and is 
shaped by, intersectionality theory, multidimensionality is distinctive 
in its analysis of subordination and privilege among individuals who 
may similarly experience a form (or multiple forms) of social margin-
alization.   
In proposing a multidimensional framework within equality doc-
trine, which addresses heterosexual normativity and privilege, Profes-
sor Hutchinson submits that “a multidimensional analysis also prob-
lematizes the notion of intersecting subordination, the primary focus 
of intersectionality scholarship.”28  He explains that  
                                                                                                                           
 25 Id.  
 26 Id. at 309-10 (citing his previous works) (internal citations omitted). 
 27 Valdes, supra note 17, at 1415.  
 28 Hutchinson, supra note 17, at 312.   
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[i]ntersectionality, for example, typically considers women of col-
or subordinate relative to men of color and white women.  The 
inclusion of sexuality hierarchies in a multidimensional analysis 
destabilizes this framework.  Heterosexist domination privileges 
heterosexual women of color (the quintessential subjects of 
intersectionality) and disadvantages lesbians of color; heterosex-
ism also marginalizes gay men of color and advantages hetero-
sexual men of color.  Multidimensionality, therefore, permits a 
more nuanced examination of the operation of privilege and 
subordination among oppressed social groups.29 
This article’s multidimensional analysis of grooming codes regu-
lating Muslim and Black women’s hair aims to effectuate Professor 
Valdes’ poignant call for the formulation of “critical coalitions that 
remain true to social justice transformation both within and among 
traditionally subordinated groups,” so that “conceptual frameworks 
[are developed] that may help foster a culture of understanding and 
coalition among multiply diverse and overlapping outgroups.”30  By 
simultaneously examining the contours and consequences of groom-
ing codes that specifically regulate how Black women and Muslim 
women adorn their heads in the workplace, this article magnifies the 
extent to which the regulation of women of color’s hair is an issue of 
significant legal, social, and political import deserving of increased 
attention and coalitional advocacy within civil rights communities 
generally and workers’ rights communities specifically.  In so doing, 
this article exposes similarities and differences in the legal protection-
ism of workplace grooming codes implicating Black and Muslim 
women.  
This article also contemplates a unique convergence of experi-
ence at the intersection of race, religion and gender under the law. For, 
a Black Muslim woman who dons a hijab and a natural hairstyle may 
suffer discrimination twofold if an employer institutes a grooming 
code that bars hijabs and natural hairstyles in the workplace—a dou-
ble form of discrimination that may simply go unredressed under cur-
rent Title VII jurisprudence. Therefore, this article embodies a multi-
dimensional analysis of these grooming mandates targeting Black and 
Muslim women so that women who identify as members of either or 
both constituencies, as well as individuals committed to advancing 
their interests, do not devalue their specific, intersecting, and com-
pounding conditions of exclusion, stigmatization, and differential 
treatment in the workplace, nor do they construct or maintain hierar-
                                                                                                                           
 29 Id. at 312-13.  
 30 Valdes, supra note 17, at 1454. 
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chical and segregationist strategies and activism for gender equality 
and inclusion.  
III. HAIR MATTERS: EEOC V. GEO GROUP, ROGERS V. AMERICAN 
AIRLINES AND ITS PROGENY  
A. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. The GEO Group, 
Incorporated  
A number of Muslim women have challenged their prospective 
and current employers’ grooming codes banning a hijab in the work-
place,31 and some have been successful in doing so.32  Despite successful 
challenges, the exclusionary and subordinating effects of grooming 
codes on historically and contemporarily marginalized women of col-
or are illuminated in religious accommodation cases involving Muslim 
women.  Though technically framed as religious discrimination, I ar-
gue that in order to more fully grasp the individual and collective 
meaning of grooming mandates regulating what can and cannot adorn 
women’s heads in the workplace, it is helpful to conceptualize accom-
modation cases initiated by Muslim women as not simply a form of 
religious discrimination, but also a form of gender-based religious dis-
crimination.33   
A hijab or a khimar is a particularly gendered symbol of an indi-
vidual’s Muslim faith, as only women wear this head covering.34  As 
Sadia Aslam explains,  
the Arabic word khimar, comes from the word khamr, meaning 
“to cover,” and therefore refers to a piece of cloth used to cover 
the head. Accordingly, when most Muslims refer to the hijab as a 
                                                                                                                           
 31 See, e.g., EEOC v. Alamo Rent-a-Car, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (D. Ariz. 2006); Webb v. City 
of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2009); EEOC v. Kelly Serv., 598 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 32 See, e.g., EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (N.D. Okla. 
2011).  
 33 Professor Sahar Aziz shares a similar opinion, arguing that “[d]ebates about a woman’s 
legal right to wear a headscarf inadequately analyze the issues through a narrow lens of religious 
freedom, while post-9/11, the Muslim headscarf symbolizes more than a mere cloth worn by a 
religious minority seeking religious accommodation.  It is a visible ‘marker’ of her membership 
in a suspect group. Thus, the label ‘Muslim’ is both a religious and racial identifier.”  Sahar Aziz, 
From the Oppressed to the Terrorist: Muslim American Women in the Crosshairs of 
Intersectionality, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 191, 196 (2012).  
Another commentator has also noted that the “freedom to wear the veil is certainly, at least 
for some women, a genuine question of religious manifestation, but also steeped in symbolism 
and sociopolitical meaning that extend far beyond religious freedom.” Sally Pei, Comment, 
Unveiling Inequality: Burqa Bans and Nondiscrimination Jurisprudence at the European Court of 
Human Rights, 122 YALE L. J. 1089, 1095 (2013) 
 34 Professor Aziz likewise deems a Muslim woman’s headscarf a “religious gender marker.”  
Aziz, supra note 33, at 193.  
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headscarf, they are actually talking about the khimar. The word, 
hijab, on the other hand, stems from the Arabic hajaba, “to pre-
vent from seeing,” and “refers to broader notions of modesty, 
privacy, and morality.”35  
Furthermore, inherent in the regulation of head coverings worn by 
Muslim women—like natural hairstyles worn by Black women—and 
its effects, are uniquely gendered dynamics of power, vulnerability, 
marginalization and inequality.  Situating Muslim women’s challenges 
to employers’ prohibitions against hijabs in the workplace within the 
discourse on gender helps to elucidate the convergence and diver-
gence in the struggle for workplace equality and inclusion among 
women.  Moreover, to place Muslim women’s employment discrimina-
tion claims solely under the umbrella of religious discrimination ob-
scures the ways in which an employer’s ban against a hijab bears on 
the very nature of one’s identity as a woman of Muslim faith.36   
 By solely characterizing bans against hijabs in the workplace as a 
form of religious discrimination, one also fails to acknowledge the 
gendered meaning of wearing a hijab post-9/11.  According to Profes-
sor Sahar Aziz, donning a hijab as a Muslim woman post-9/11 “engen-
ders [gender] subordination in ways overlooked by generic strategies 
against Muslim (male) discrimination . . . [in that a Muslim woman’s] 
headscarf marks her as a terrorist, terrorist sympathizer, unassimilable 
foreigner, and an oppressed woman.”37  Therefore, in a post-9/11 con-
text, for some, a hijab is a symbol of racialized, religious, and gendered 
otherness denoting patriarchal subordination, and attendant radical-
ism and violent threats to socio-political normativity as well as nation-
al security, which justifies governmental and private measures to 
shrink its visibility in myriad spheres.38 The enactment of grooming 
codes banning hijabs in American workplaces may very well be symp-
tomatic of the pejorative sociopolitical meaning associated with this 
uniquely gendered religious garb and corresponding animus, stereo-
typing or bias at the intersection race, religion, and gender.  Notably, 
however, recent Title VII cases that challenge private employers’ bans 
are generally denominated as an employer’s failure to accommodate a 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Sadia Aslam, Note, Hijab in the Workplace: Why Title VII Does Not Adequately Protect 
Employees From Discrimination on the Basis of Religious Dress and Appearance, 80 U.M.K.C. L. 
REV. 221, 224 (2011).  
 36 See Marie A. Failinger, Finding a Voice of Challenge: The State Responds to Religious 
Women and Their Communities, 21 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 137 (2012). 
 37 Aziz, supra note 33, at 225.  
 38 See Pei, supra note 33, at 1 (explaining that over the past decade, European countries 
like France and Belgium have proscribed veils worn by Muslim women in public spaces and that 
other European nations are deliberating whether to enact such proscriptions).  
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religious observance in accordance with its “neutral” or universal poli-
cy of prohibiting hair or head coverings in the workplace, rather than 
a targeted employment policy ridden with negative racial, gender, 
and/or religious stereotypes, bias, or animus.39   
In EEOC v. GEO Group, Inc., three Muslim women—Carmen 
Sharpe-Allen, Marquita King, and Rashemma Moss—alleged that 
GEO, a private company contracted to run a prison, violated Title 
VII’s proscriptions against religious discrimination in its adoption and 
enforcement of a “no headgear policy,” which precluded them from 
wearing a khimar: an Islamic religious head scarf, designed to cover 
the hair, forehead, sides of the neck, shoulders, and chest.40  Specifical-
ly, these three Muslim women contended that GEO failed to accom-
modate their religious beliefs in barring them from donning a khimar 
in the workplace.  For several years prior to GEO’s implementation of 
its “zero tolerance headgear policy,” Sharpe-Allen and King wore a 
khimar while working.41  In fact, during their initial interviews with 
GEO both women wore a khimar.42 Notably, GEO enacted the no-
headgear policy on the same day that Moss, a correctional officer who 
recently converted to Islam, sought permission from a supervisor to 
wear a khimar.43  Hours after receiving Moss’ written request, two su-
pervisors informed Moss that they were denying her request, and that 
all employees would be banned “from wearing hats and covering their 
head.”44 On the same day, a memo was issued to the employees stating 
that “there are no authorized hats, caps, or attire, which can be worn 
inside the jail and there are no exceptions to this policy.”45  Nonethe-
less, Moss, Sharpe-Allen, and King sought a religious accommodation 
to GEO’s “no headgear policy” to no avail.  
According to Moss, in response to her request to wear a khimar, a 
supervisor stated that “no religion would be honored in the jail,”46 yet 
GEO permitted an exception to its policy requiring male employees 
to be clean-shaven for male employees who wore beards for religious 
reasons.47  Moreover, the women were not permitted to wear khimars 
though management was aware of the importance that each woman 
placed on covering her hair in observance of their religious beliefs.48  
                                                                                                                           
 39 See generally EEOC v. GEO Group, Inc., 616 F.3d 265, 277-92 (3d Cir. 2010).   
 40 See id. at 291. 
 41 See id. at 278-80.  
 42 See id.  
 43 Id. at 281. 
 44 Id. at 281-82. 
 45 Id. at 282. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id.  
 48 Id.  
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The religious and personal significance of wearing a khimar for Moss, 
Sharpe-Allen, and King was further diminished when a supervisor 
explained that GEO was unable to exempt Moss from the grooming 
policy, as she was potentially responsible for originating “a fad or a 
fashion statement because [other employees were] wearing the same . 
. . headscarf.”49  
In a weak (and arguably disingenuous) effort to accommodate 
the women’s religious conflict with the “no headgear policy,” man-
agement proposed that they could wear a synthetic wig in lieu of a 
khimar50—an eerily similar “accommodation” to a no-braids policy 
offered to Renee Rodgers, as seen later in Rogers v. American Air-
lines.51  Contrary to Title VII’s objectives, GEO management essential-
ly presented all three women with the same choice: observe your reli-
gious beliefs or lose your job.52  According to Sharpe-Allen, a supervi-
sor informed her that if she wore her khimar to work she would be 
denied access to the building.53  Management informed Carmen 
Sharpe-Allen that she could either work without the khimar, continue 
wearing her khimar and resign, or be terminated.54  Sharpe-Allen 
claimed that she informed her supervisor that she enjoyed her job, but 
in light of the fact that wearing a khimar to work had not presented 
any problems in the past, she would not be able to compromise on 
wearing the khimar while working.55  By refusing to comply with the 
directive to return to work without wearing the khimar, GEO fired 
Sharpe-Allen on the ground that she abandoned her job.56   
Marquita King, who had worn a khimar for five years until 
GEO’s implementation of a “no headgear policy,” was also told that 
she would be fired if she continued to wear the khimar.57  Due to the 
distressing nature of the predicament in which she was placed—either 
exercise her religious beliefs or lose her job—King took a leave of 
absence from work and returned to work only to comply with the “no 
headgear” policy.58  Rashemma Moss was likewise instructed that she 
would be suspended without pay if she continued wearing a khimar at 
                                                                                                                           
 49 Id.  
 50 See id. at 271; see also id. at 291 (the court holding that management’s proposed accom-
modation was unreasonable). 
 51 See infra Part III.B-C.  
 52 See GEO Group, 616 F.3d at 282-83. 
 53 Id. at 283. 
 54 Id. at 269. 
 55 Id.  
 56 Id.  
 57 Id.  
 58 Id.  
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work.59  Faced with the choice of being suspended without compensa-
tion or observing her religious beliefs, Moss also stopped wearing the 
khimar to work.60  
GEO claimed that it instituted the “no headgear” policy in an ef-
fort to “crack down” on employees wearing unauthorized hats or 
baseball caps, which allegedly made them indistinguishable from pris-
oners.61  Moreover, GEO asserted that it would suffer an undue bur-
den if it provided a religious accommodation to its no-headgear policy 
in that allowing the female employees to wear a khimar would create 
a safety risk.  According to GEO, the khimar could be “taken away 
from [a female employee] and used against [her], in any form of a 
choking movement and could be used as a restraint device.”62  Though 
this reason was based upon conjecture, as no prisoner had ever at-
tempted to choke or strangle an employee with an employee’s head 
covering or any other piece of clothing, the court accepted GEO’s 
rationale.63  
Thirdly, GEO claimed that it could not make any accommoda-
tions to the no-headgear policy because it would cause an undue bur-
den with respect to prison resources, as the prison would have to lock 
down the prisoners at different checkpoints in order to ensure that the 
plaintiffs were not smuggling contraband into and around the facility 
and to ensure against misidentification.64  Notably, the majority did not 
find GEO’s final reason the most persuasive,65 and the dissenting jus-
tice concluded that it could be inferred that the reasons management 
offered were pretextual in light of: its inconsistent testimony regarding 
the underlying motivations for the no headgear policy; the policy was 
prompted by Moss’s request to wear a hijab; a day following the im-
plementation of the policy, Moss was singularly reprimanded for wear-
ing a khimar while other employees were not reprimanded for wear-
ing secular hats; and kitchen staff were still permitted to wear hats 
though they were in daily contact with prisoners.66  Nonetheless, the 
majority held as a matter of law that GEO’s blanket enforcement of 
                                                                                                                           
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 272. 
 62 Id.  
 63 See id. at 274. 
 64 See id. at 273. 
 65 See id. at 274 (agreeing that “additional time and resources of prison officials” would be 
necessary to verify the identity of the female Muslim employees donning a khimar at several 
security checkpoints throughout the prison, yet acknowledging that GEO did not proffer a com-
pletely persuasive argument that it would be necessary to “lock down the prisoners in each such 
location” to ensure accurate identification).  
 66 See id. at 286. 
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its grooming code against the three female Muslim plaintiffs did not 
constitute religious discrimination under Title VII.67 
B. Rogers v. American Airlines and Its Progeny 
In 1981, then federal district court judge Abraham D. Soafer de-
cided the seminal case involving the legality of grooming codes that 
regulate a Black woman’s choice of hairstyle under our current anti-
discrimination laws: Rogers v. American Airlines.68  In Rogers, the court 
declared that American Airlines’ grooming policy that barred em-
ployees from wearing braided hairstyles did not violate Title VII’s pro-
tections against race and gender discrimination.69  For more than three 
decades, numerous courts have blindly followed the Rogers decision in 
adjudicating legal challenges to proscriptions against Black women’s 
commonly worn hairstyles—namely natural hairstyles like locks, 
braids, and twists70—in the workplace.71  In so doing, courts have uni-
formly rejected Black women’s claims that such grooming mandates 
uniquely discriminate against them on the basis of race and gender in 
that they not only effectuate unequal burdens on Black women to 
obtain and maintain employment but also permit arbitrary exclusion 
of Black women from employment opportunity.72   
One year into her position as a customer service agent, Renee 
Rodgers,73 an eleven-year American Airlines employee, donned a 
cornrow hairstyle, which American Airlines decided to formally ban.  
Rodgers challenged American Airlines’ grooming policy prohibiting 
customer service agents from wearing all-braided hairstyles under 
                                                                                                                           
 67 See id. at 286-289. 
 68 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).  
 69 Id. at 231.   
 70 Interestingly, however, courts have found that an employer’s ban against an Afro may 
violate antidiscrimination law. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164 
(7th Cir. 1976). 
 71 See, e.g., Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Inc., No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306, at *6 (M.D. 
Ga. Apr. 25, 2008) (holding that a grooming policy prohibiting employees from wearing natural 
hairstyles uncovered did not violate federal proscriptions against race discrimination); McBride 
v. Lawstaf, Inc., No. 1:96-cv-0196-cc, 1996 WL 755779, at *1–2 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 1996) (rejecting 
plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim by holding that the plaintiff’s opposition to her employer–
temporary staffing agency’s policy of not referring “qualified applicants with ‘braided’ hair styles 
for employment positions” was not protected activity because such policy as a matter of law did 
not violate Title VII’s proscriptions against race–based employment practices). 
 72 See, e.g., Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Inc., No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306, at *1 (M.D. 
Ga. Apr. 25, 2008).  
 73 Professor Paulette Caldwell reveals in her scholarly examination of the case that the 
accurate spelling of the plaintiff’s last name is Rodgers though the official case name spells it 
Rogers.  See Paulette M. Caldwell, Intersectional Bias and the Courts: The Story of Rogers v. 
American Airlines, in RACE LAW STORIES 571, 571 n.12 (Devon W. Carbado & Rachel F. Moran 
eds., 2008). 
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Title VII and other civil rights laws.74  She raised an intersectional 
claim of discrimination, contending that the grooming policy discrimi-
nated against her as Black woman and other Black women since corn-
rows were “historically, a fashion and style adopted by Black Ameri-
can women, reflective of cultural, historical essence of Black women 
in American society.”75  The court rejected Rodgers’ contention that 
American Airlines’ prohibition against all-braided hairstyles consti-
tuted a discriminatory policy on the basis of sex or race. 
In dismissing Rodgers’ discrimination case, the court attempted 
to analyze her claims as independent and mutually exclusive claims of 
sex and race discrimination; yet, in concluding that the grooming poli-
cy did not violate Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination, the 
court expressly considered the extent to which the policy affected em-
ployees at the intersection of race and gender.76  Specifically, the court 
held that American Airlines’ grooming policy did not invidiously nor 
singularly discriminate on the basis of sex because the policy applied 
to Black and white men, as well as Black and white women.77  In its 
separate analysis of Rodgers’ race discrimination claim, the court held 
that a viable race-based challenge against American Airlines’ groom-
ing policy necessitated that Rodgers put forth an essentialist claim 
that all, most, or only Black Americans wore braided hairstyles.78  The 
court reasoned that Rodgers was unable to meet this prima facie re-
quirement by referencing the fact that Bo Derrek, a white actress, 
donned cornrows in the movie “10.”79  Again, the court looked to an 
isolated experience of a white woman to determine the legitimacy of 
Rodgers’ race discrimination claim.  The court appropriated this ex-
ceptional instance of a white woman wearing cornrows as its justifica-
tion for holding that Rodgers and like plaintiffs could not challenge 
employer bans against braids on racial grounds, as they could not 
maintain that only Black women wore braids and this hairstyle there-
fore held a particular cultural significance for Black women.80  
                                                                                                                           
 74 Rogers v. Am. Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 75 Id. at 231-32. 
 76 See generally id. at 231-232;  CALDWELL, supra note 73 (arguing that the court framed 
Rodger’s intersectional claim of sex and race discrimination as analytically distinct claims and 
thus failed to recognize that the injury Rodgers allegedly suffered was the consequence of inter-
dependent and mutually reinforcing dynamics of racism and sexism).  
 77 Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231. 
 78 Id.  
 79 Id. at 232. 
 80 Indeed, the court accepted the employer’s implication that Rodgers simply mimicked Bo 
Derek’s corn-row style because she began wearing her hair in a similar style “soon after the style 
had been popularized by [the] white actress.”  Id. at 231.  
2013] A Multidimensional Analysis on What Not to Wear 349 
Consequently, the court could not concede the particular stigma-
tization and offense that Renee Rodgers, as a Black woman, would 
experience when American Airlines instructed that: as a customer 
service representative, her donning cornrows was specifically prohib-
ited because it did not reflect the “conservative and business-like im-
age” that American Airlines’ grooming policy intended to enforce;81 
she could wear the cornrows off-duty; and if she were to maintain her 
cornrows she could not wear her hair freely but rather she would need 
to “wear her hair into a bun and wrap a hairpiece around the bun dur-
ing working hours.”82  American Airline’s grooming regulations con-
veyed the message (which the court reified) that cornrows—a natural 
hairstyle Black women commonly and most notably wear—was an 
unprofessional and immodest hairstyle in need of covering and thus, 
an unacceptable and impermissible hairstyle for Black women to wear 
in their professional capacities, especially when engaging with the 
public.83  Indeed, the court was rather dismissive of not only the stig-
matic84 but also the physical injury that American Airlines inflicted 
upon Rodgers by requiring that she wear a hairpiece to mask her nat-
ural hairstyle.  In response to Rodger’s claims that she suffered severe 
headaches from wearing a hairpiece, the court suggested rather im-
perviously that “a larger hairpiece would seem in order.”85   
The court further legitimized American Airlines and subsequent 
employers’ proffers of such “accommodations” or alternative hair-
styles to Black women who wear natural hairstyles that the employers 
subjectively perceive as unprofessional or undesirable even though 
they may engender physical pain, and additional monetary and/or 
time investment.86  Affording legal protection to such subjective poli-
cies and practices also reeks of unsettling paternalism, invasiveness, 
and insolence. Doing so also confers employers with unparalleled 
power and privilege to instruct Black women on what hairstyles are 
“best suited” for them personally and professionally.  Indeed, more 
than three decades after Rogers, employers remain legally protected 
                                                                                                                           
 81 Id. at 233. 
 82 Id.  
 83 It appears that American Airlines permitted Black women who did not work as custom-
er service agents to wear braided hairstyles.  See id. (opining that Rodgers’ acknowledgement 
that some Black women were allowed to wear cornrows undermined her sex and intersectional 
sex and race discrimination claims).   
 84 In addition to a Title VII clam against race and sex discrimination, Rodgers alleged that 
American Airline’s prohibition against braided hairstyles constituted “a badge of slavery” or 
rather imposed a negative racial stigma in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.  Rogers, 527 
F. Supp. at 231.   
 85 Id. at 233. 
 86 See, e.g., Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Inc., No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306, at *1 (M.D. 
Ga. Apr. 25, 2008). 
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in meting out unsolicited counsel and limitless conditions on Black 
women’s hairstyle choices.   
In Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Patricia Pitts, a two-year employee for 
a Georgia amusement park, alleged that upon wearing a cornrow hair-
style, her supervisor informed her that she did not “approve” of her 
braids and told Pitts “she should get her hair done in a ‘pretty’ hair-
style.”87  In response to her supervisor’s unsolicited suggestion or di-
rective, Pitts restyled her hair in another natural hairstyle: two-strand 
twists.88  Pitts’ supervisor again disapproved of her hairstyle because it 
resembled dreadlocks.89  Despite her supervisor’s disapproval, Pitts 
refused to change her hairstyle.90  Soon thereafter, the amusement 
park’s official company policy reflected the supervisor’s subjective 
preferences and opinions of natural hairstyles.  The amusement park 
issued a memo to employees announcing its new policy prohibiting 
“dreadlocks, cornrows, beads, and shells’ that are not ‘covered by a hat 
[or] visor.”91 Thereafter, Patricia Pitts, like Renee Rodgers thirty years 
prior, challenged Wild Adventure’s grooming policy, contending that 
its’ banning “Afrocentric” hairstyles was racially discriminatory.92  Fol-
lowing the Rogers court’s lead, the Pitts court also held that Pitt’s con-
tention that her employer’s prohibition against uncovered natural 
hairstyles was an act of intentional race discrimination was meritless.93  
Grooming policies like those judicially approved in Rogers and 
Pitts, which bar Black women from wearing braided hairstyles or forc-
es their covering, divest Black women of complete autonomy over 
deeply personal,94 political,95 as well as pragmatic96 grooming choices 
and bespeak a unique sense of identity informed by broader race and 
sex dynamics.97  Moreover, arming employers with unlimited control 
                                                                                                                           
 87 See id.  
 88 Id.  
 89 Id.  
 90 Id.  
 91 Id.  
 92 Id.  
 93 Id. at *6.  
 94 Greene, supra note 16, at 428-30.   
 95 See Paulette Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 
1991 DUKE L. J. 365, 369-71 (1991).  
 96 See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis 
Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1112-1120 (2010) (detailing the ways in which donning natural 
hairstyles exempts Black women from bearing significant financial costs and time burdens to 
achieve a straight hairstyle through permanent relaxers, temporary straightening agents, and hair 
extensions or wigs, resulting physical damage to one’s hair and/or scalp as well as negative psy-
chological costs due to attempts to conform to a raced and gendered beauty norm). 
 97 See Greene, supra note 16, at nn.6-7 (noting that Black women’s natural hair has been 
and continues to be the subject of negative racial stigmatization and a marker for exclusion, 
degradation, and dehumanization). 
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over whether and the manner in which a Black woman can wear a 
natural hairstyle deprives Black women power and privilege over how 
they adorn their heads and limits employment opportunities for which 
they are qualified. Thus, employers’ formal and informal regulations of 
Black women’s natural hairstyles essentially amount to arbitrary, dis-
criminatory conditions of employment at the intersection of race and 
gender. 98 
C. Hair Matters: Synthesizing EEOC v. GEO Group, Rogers v. 
American Airlines, and Pitts v. Wild Adventure  
Unequivocally, Geo Group, Rogers, and Pitts demonstrate the 
high level of deference that courts accord to employers in their en-
actment and enforcement of grooming codes regulating the manner in 
which women of color can adorn their hair in the workplace.  Indeed, 
in all three cases, these women and their choices concerning their hair 
were not simply rejected but also denigrated in the process by man-
agement.  Critical analysis of Geo Group, Rogers, and Pitts present 
striking parallels in the lack of understanding, respect, autonomy, and 
dignity the employers conferred to the Black and Muslim female em-
ployees who donned natural hairstyles and hijabs in the workplace.  
As previously stated, a hijab is a gendered religious marker.  Though 
not uniquely worn by women, a braided hairstyle is a racial marker, 
which can implicate a particular gendered meaning when adorned by 
women. Indeed, Patricia Pitt’s supervisor opined that Pitt’s cornrow 
hairstyle was not “pretty”; thereby in wearing braids, Pitts did not con-
form to her supervisor’s notions of femininity, attractiveness or wom-
anhood.99 Notably, in Geo Group and Rogers, the employer suggested 
to its Muslim female employees to wear a headpiece on the one hand 
and forced a Black female employee to wear the same on the other 
hand; in both instances, management’s response constituted a clear 
effort to eliminate or diminish their respective religious and racial 
markers in the workplace.    Consequently, a unifying thread between 
the express elimination and forced masking of gendered religious or 
racial markers adorned by Black and Muslim women is the norm of 
assimilation or homogeneity that the employers sought to achieve in 
the workplace.100 
Furthermore, in requesting and mandating that Muslim and 
Black women cover their hair with hairpieces, management clearly 
demonstrated its lack of understanding of the particular significance 
                                                                                                                           
 98 See generally id.  
 99 See id. at 416. 
 100 See infra Part IV.B. 
352 FIU Law Review [8:333 
of donning a natural hairstyle or hijab for these women, as well as a 
lack of engagement with the women to understand the importance of 
the way in which they adorn their hair.  Cumulatively, Rogers and Pitts 
legitimize employer requests and mandates concerning Black wom-
en’s  natural hairstyles (which are not afros) in the workplace that are 
not only stigmatizing, intrusive, and offensive, but also result in physi-
cal discomfort and significant investments in time, energy, and financ-
es.  Current antidiscrimination doctrine therefore accords employers a 
particular privilege and power over Black women, in that legally pro-
tected formal and informal regulation of and conditions placed upon 
their natural hair subject Black women to a unique vulnerability, dis-
empowerment, and devaluation in the American workplace.  Corre-
spondingly, unrestrained authority to regulate Black women’s natural 
hair indeed deprives and tends to deprive Black women of employ-
ment, privilege, freedom, equality in treatment and full recognition as 
a woman within their workplaces.  Yet, in upholding American Air-
line’s grooming policy, the Rogers court opined that employers’ poli-
cies prohibiting braided hairstyles and requiring their disguise while 
working were a matter of minimal importance, as they “at most [had] 
a negligible effect on employment opportunity.”101  The court further 
proclaimed that such appearance mandates “[did] not offend a sub-
stantial interest”102 that Black women may hold. Unfortunately, anti-
discrimination doctrine remains affixed to such notions as it pertains 
to the contours and consequences of workplace regulations of Black 
women’s natural hairstyles.103  
The Third Circuit in GEO Group acknowledged the unreasona-
bleness of GEO management’s proposal to have women wear wigs in 
lieu of khimars, in light of the fact that the women explained they 
wore a khimar to specifically cover their hair as an act of “guard[ing] 
[her] modesty” in accordance with their interpretation of the Koran.104  
GEO management was quite dismissive of the plaintiffs’ individual 
and collective religious reasons for wearing a khimar, evidenced by 
their supervisors’ responses to their requests for religious accommo-
dation.  By proposing that they wear wigs in lieu of a khimars, GEO 
management simply disregarded the women’s express religious beliefs.  
                                                                                                                           
 101 Rogers v. Am. Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 102 Id. at 233.  
 103 See, e.g., Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Inc., No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306, at *6 (M.D. 
Ga. Apr. 25, 2008) (holding that employers’ prohibitions against natural hairstyles do not violate 
antidiscrimination protections against race discrimination because such bans “[do] not implicate 
a fundamental right”).  See also, e.g., McBride v. Lawstaf, Inc., No. 1:96-CV-0196-CC, 1996 WL 
755779, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 1996) (holding that an employer’s policy barring braided hair-
styles does not violate Title VII as a matter of law).  
 104 EEOC v. GEO Group, 616 F.3d 265, 291 (3rd Cir. 2010). 
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The supervisors further diminished the religious significance of wear-
ing a khimar for Sharpe-Allen, Moss, and King and other Muslim 
women by equating it to a “fad” or fashion statement.  In doing so, 
management implied that permitting one woman to wear a khimar 
resulted in organized acts of female empowerment on the part of oth-
er Muslim women who also wore khimars—perceived acts of collec-
tive identity formation and activism—that needed to end.105    
Indeed, with respect to GEO management, its lack of engage-
ment with Sharpe-Allen, Moss, and King defied its legal obligation to 
make a “good faith effort” to accommodate their religious observanc-
es.  Yet, despite its claim that no religion would be honored in the 
workplace, GEO management expressly accommodated the religious 
observances of male employees by exempting men who wore beards 
for religious reasons from its policy that male employees be clean-
shaven.  In so doing, GEO privileged the religious observances and 
beliefs of male employees over those of female employees.  Thus, one 
could surmise that gender-based religious animus or bias animated 
GEO management’s decision not to exempt the Muslim women from 
its grooming policy.  Furthermore, one could also conclude that 
GEO’s headgear proscription equated to a deliberate effort to cease 
Muslim women’s donning of this particular gender-based religious 
garment, and, as women, the attendant expression of their religious 
identity and freedom as well as their autonomy, agency, and status 
equal to that exercised by, and conferred to, men in the workplace.  
Accordingly, it is important to conceptualize workplace bans against 
religious attire worn uniquely by women as a matter of gender equali-
ty and inclusion and thus situate the legal challenges against these 
grooming policies within women’s rights discourse, advocacy, and 
movements.106  
Though the courts’ views differed regarding the legality of an 
employer’s requirement that a Black woman wear a head piece to 
cover her natural hairstyle, and an employer’s suggestion to a Muslim 
woman that she wear a wig in place of a khimar, the courts in Geo 
Group, Rogers, and Pitts maintained grooming policies affecting wom-
en of color that were equally stigmatizing, exclusionary, intrusive, and 
                                                                                                                           
 105  See also Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc.,  538 F.2d 164, 169 (7th Cir. 1976) 
(Black female plaintiff similarly alleging that while being informed she was denied a promotion 
because of her Afro hairstyle, a supervisor also accused of her “being a leader of the girls on the 
floor”).  
 106 See generally Failinger, supra note 36.   See also Aziz, supra note 33, at 239 (arguing that 
a Muslim woman who dons a hijab is “caught in the crosshairs of intersectionality at her own 
peril” as Islamic, and Black civil rights organizations as well as antidiscrimination doctrine fails 
to address the particular subordination at the intersection of race, religion, in gender that Muslim 
women suffer).  
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offensive.  Indeed, GEO management openly contemplated the physi-
cal exclusion of Muslim women who wore a khimar on its premises 
and in doing so, demonstrated unmitigated contempt for, and control 
over, Muslim women’s rights to express their religious identity.  One 
supervisor informed one of the plaintiffs that if she arrived to work 
wearing her khimar she would be barred from entering the workplace, 
and that GEO planned to not only prohibit Muslim employees from 
wearing a khimar, but also Muslim women who donned khimars while 
visiting prisoners.107  By upholding GEO Group’s “zero tolerance no-
headgear policy”—again prompted by Moss’s request to wear a 
khimar after her conversion to Islam—the Third Circuit seemingly 
maintained a discriminatory policy at the intersection of religion and 
gender in that it appears GEO Group specifically targeted Muslim 
women, the wholesale exclusion of their bodies when donning a 
khimar, and the amputation of their religious personhood.  
In all three cases, by not complying with discriminatory and arbi-
trary grooming policies, women of color lost or were at risk of losing 
their jobs for which they were qualified.  Moreover, by upholding all 
of the challenged grooming policies, the courts in Geo Group, Rogers, 
and Pitts subjected women of color to an unjustified deprivation of 
economic security that employment provides in addition to compara-
ble vulnerability, lack of agency, autonomy, and dignity.  Indeed, Black 
and Muslim women who feel complete by wearing natural hairstyles 
or a hijab yet who are forced to cover and deny an inherent part of 
their individual identity as a woman are differently burdened than 
other women and men in this regard.  For, these women of color are 
required to engage in “identity performance” which “can be at odds 
with the employee’s sense of identity [and thus] to the extent the em-
ployee’s continued existence and success in the workplace is contin-
gent upon her behaving in ways that operate as a denial of self, there 
is continual harm to that employee’s dignity.”108  
IV.  A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS OF HIJABS AND NATURAL 
HAIRSTYLES IN THE WORKPLACE AND BEYOND 
A. Legal Protection for Hijabs and Natural Hairstyles in the Work-
place 
Geo Group, Rogers, and Pitts, reveal that as women of color, 
Black and Muslim women are subject to grooming codes that are the 
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products of racial and gender stereotypes and bias and they bear 
analogous forms of exclusion, subordination, and stigmatization due 
to their intersectional identities.  These cases also illustrate that for 
some Black women, the decision to wear natural hairstyles as well as 
for some Muslim women, the decision to wear a hijab in the work-
place is an emancipatory act, which signifies a demand for equal 
treatment and full recognition of their dignity, personhood, freedom, 
and autonomy as women.  Despite the similarities in the legal treat-
ment of these women of color and their corresponding experiences, 
significant divergences in the legal recognition of Muslim and Black 
women’s ability to wear hijabs and natural hairstyles respectively in 
the workplace exist, which is important to note.  
Namely, with respect to the legal recognition of Black women’s 
right to wear a natural hairstyle in the workplace, courts have ex-
pressed that only a workplace ban against an afro may violate antidis-
crimination protections against race discrimination.109  Indeed, since 
Rogers, courts have repeatedly held that workplace bans against natu-
ral hairstyles that Black women don, like twists, locks, or braids, as a 
matter of law do not violate prohibitions against race discrimination.110  
The Rogers court reasoned that a workplace ban against braided hair-
styles on its face did not constitute racial discrimination because un-
like an afro (which theoretically is a protected hairstyle),111 a braided 
hairstyle is “not the product of natural hair growth but of artifice.”112  
Per the court’s reasoning, presumably Black people are born with an 
afro; thus,  an afro is an immutable, “natural” trait for most if not all 
individuals who identify as Black.  Moreover, a braided hairstyle is not 
and cannot be achieved through the styling of one’s naturally textured 
hair; rather, it is only accomplished through the addition of natural or 
synthetic hair.113  In its lack of understanding of the diversity of hair-
styles and hair textures of (as well as the socio-cultural and intrinsic 
significance of hair for) those who identify as Black women, regretta-
bly, the Rogers court fortified a narrow legal principle that protection 
against race discrimination is extended to challenges against employ-
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ment policies and practices that implicate inherent, “immutable” char-
acteristics.114  
Naturally, Renee Rodgers and subsequent Black plaintiffs chal-
lenging grooming codes barring natural hairstyles could not satisfy the 
foregoing legal prerequisites for race and gender discrimination cases, 
which “simply missed the point” according to Professor Paulette 
Caldwell, that “women of color should not necessarily be denied relief 
because a challenged employment practice does not harm the men of 
their racial group or white women,”115 or women or men who do not 
identify as Black.  Furthermore, as I have previously argued, by en-
dorsing an immutability requirement, which has become imbedded in 
antidiscrimination doctrine,116 a court dismisses the nuanced nature of 
the racialization process, whereby the conceptualization of “race in-
cludes physical appearances and behaviors that society, historically 
and presently, commonly associates with a particular racial group, 
even when the physical appearances and behaviors are not ‘uniquely’ 
or ‘exclusively’ ‘performed’ by, or attributed to a particular racial 
group.”117  Thus, the construction of race embodies the observation and 
signification of both mutable and immutable characteristics—an un-
derstanding that the Rogers court (and later the Pitts court)118 rejected 
in its adoption of an immutability requirement, which affords relief for 
differential treatment based upon presumably inherent, unalterable 
physical traits, like skin color, and thereby superficially narrows the 
purview of protection against race discrimination under current anti-
discrimination laws.119  
Judicial promulgation of this immutability requirement is based 
upon a legal, political, and social fiction that race is a biological and 
fixed construct. As a result, if any characteristic or behavior is to be 
deemed “racial” in nature, every individual, if not most individuals 
who identify or are perceived as a member of a particular racial group, 
must share in or display the characteristics or behaviors at issue.  No-
tably, the conceptualization of religion, unlike race, is not as grounded 
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in this fiction of immutability, as it is pervasively recognized that reli-
gion is a mutable feature of one’s identity since an individual can as-
cribe to various religious faiths or none at all throughout her lifetime.  
Consequently, legal doctrine does not require a religious discrimina-
tion plaintiff to demonstrate that individuals who share in the plain-
tiff’s religious identity ascribe to identical religious beliefs and obser-
vances.  Therefore, in order to maintain a viable claim of religious dis-
crimination, a Muslim woman need not demonstrate that all or most 
Muslim women wear a hijab in observance of their religious beliefs.120  
However, to assert an actionable race-based (or intersectional 
race and gender-based) challenge against workplace grooming codes 
that proscribe natural hairstyles, Black women must satisfy an immu-
tability requirement by demonstrating that all, most, or only individu-
als who identify as Black or as Black women wear natural hairstyles.  
Fundamentally, Black women cannot meet such an essentialist re-
quirement. Therefore, antidiscrimination law leaves Black women un-
protected against the enforcement of workplace grooming codes that 
effectuate differential treatment at the intersection of race and gen-
der.  The operation of the immutability requirement has essentially 
obliterated legal recognition for natural hairstyles worn by Black 
women and legal protection against grooming codes barring or dimin-
ishing these hairstyles in the workplace.  As a consequence, employers 
are afforded limitless prerogative and freedom to expressly subordi-
nate and usurp an inherent part of many Black women’s identity, as 
well as constrain the ways in which a Black woman can wear her hair 
in the workplace,121 even though such mandates implicate race and 
gender and are irrelevant to job performance and qualifications.  
Conversely, as it relates to Black and Muslim women’s preroga-
tive concerning their hair, antidiscrimination law affords Muslim 
women a legal right to don a hijab in the private workplace—though 
not absolute122—and a resulting privilege of legal recognition which 
Black women simply do not possess.  Indeed, Muslim women have 
brought successful legal challenges against workplace grooming codes 
banning hijabs whereas Black women have enjoyed minimal extra-
legal success and effectively no legal success in their challenges 
against natural hairstyle prohibitions in the workplace.123  Despite 
                                                                                                                           
 120 See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1285 (N.D. Okla. 
2011). 
 121 See generally Greene, supra note 16. 
 122 Abercrombie, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1272. 
 123 See Greene, supra note 16, at 414 (noting the influence of protests and boycotts that civil 
and labor rights communities organized against national employers who prohibited braided 
hairstyles in the mid to late 1980s). 
358 FIU Law Review [8:333 
Muslim women’s relative legal privilege and success, judicial decisions 
that uphold arbitrary workplace regulations, which are fraught with 
disrespect for, and refutation of, Black and Muslim women’s deeply 
personal choices as women to cover or not to cover their hair convey a 
message to Black and Muslim women, as well employers, that the in-
clusion of these women of color in American workplaces can rest up-
on their compliance with express and implicit forms of race, religion, 
and gender subordination, marginalization, and exclusion. 
B. Hijabs and Natural Hairstyles: A Multidimensional Analysis of 
Meaning for Women of Color 
In recognizing Muslim women’s relative yet imperfect privilege 
of protection and recognition under the law to wear a hijab in the 
workplace, it is important not to dismiss the interconnectivity between 
the socio-political and personal meaning of Black women’s natural 
hairstyles and Muslim women’s hijabs, and the resulting shared and 
divergent experiences for these women of color.  First, not all Muslim 
women wear a hijab, and those who wear a religious head covering 
commit to doing so for myriad reasons.  For example, many Muslim 
women wear a head covering as a reflection of their spiritual and 
physical modesty in observance of their religious beliefs.124 Others may 
don a hijab in furtherance of both their faith and practical concerns 
“such as avoiding the negative effects of obsession with beauty and 
sexuality on women”125 like sexual objectification and sexual harass-
ment.126 Accordingly, Muslim women who wear a hijab often feel that 
doing so is liberating and self-empowering and view the hijab as a sig-
nification to others to treat them equally and with respect.127 Some 
Muslim women also believe that wearing a hijab provides an oppor-
tunity to contest misunderstandings and stereotypes within both Mus-
lim and non-Muslim communities about Islam, Muslim women, and 
their roles in society.128  
Similarly, not all Black women wear natural hairstyles, and for 
those Black women who do, the reasons are likewise varied and are 
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not mutually exclusive.129  Black women may wear a natural hairstyle 
to minimize or eliminate the physical and financial inconveniences 
that come along with wearing straightened hairstyles.130  Black women 
may wear their hair naturally for aesthetic reasons, as a form of ra-
cial/ethnic expression, and/or to challenge pervasive expectations and 
pressures to wear a straightened hairstyle as an implicit petition for 
genuine inclusion, respect, and equal treatment.131  Finally, Black wom-
en donning natural hairstyles are also simply wearing their hair the 
way in which it grows on their heads—with or without any motive or 
meaning.  Thus, like hijabs for some Muslim women, donning natural 
hairstyles for some Black women is a defining feature of their identity 
and personhood.   
How women adorn their heads are particularly personal choices; 
yet, “a black woman’s hair [and more specifically, her choice to wear a 
natural hairstyle] continues to threaten the social, political, and eco-
nomic fabric of American life”132 in analogous ways to Muslim women 
donning a hijab.  According to Professor Paulette Caldwell, “what 
links [an] afro or natural hairstyles and so-called ‘artificial ones’ (such 
as braids) is a question of assimilation”133 in that donning an afro or 
any other natural hairstyle, much like donning a hijab, can be per-
ceived as a “challenge to the status quo, especially its dominant cul-
tural manifestations, [and] are identified as major threats to central 
national values.”134  Consequently, vis á vis their natural hairstyles and 
religious hair coverings, Black women and Muslim women are marked 
as racial and gendered “others,” as they do not represent the prevail-
ing white, female, Protestant normative standard of womanhood and 
they are deemed “radical” or “militant.”  
Indeed, the perceived subversiveness contemporarily associated 
with Black and Muslim identities and the undeniable interconnectivity 
between the socio-politically constructed identities of Blacks and 
Muslims was best illustrated on the infamous cover of the New Yorker 
magazine entitled “The Politics of Fear.”  On the July 2008 magazine 
cover, a caricature of then Presidential candidate, Senator Barack 
Obama, is wearing traditional religious attire worn by male Muslims 
in tact with a turban, burning an American flag while bumping fists 
with his wife, Michelle Obama, whose caricature is donning an en-
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larged afro, a military inspired outfit and an AK-47.135  Most notably, 
an afro adorned Mrs. Obama’s head which conveys a deep socio-
political meaning; for, Black women’s donning of a natural hairstyle—
namely afros—has denoted and continue to denote Black women, 
much like the headscarf marks Muslim woman: as an anarchist gener-
ally, and as “a disloyal and Anti-American terrorist or terrorist sympa-
thizer” more specifically.136  
This caricature aligns the experience of Muslim and Black wom-
en in very poignant ways in that the afro is central to the signification 
of Mrs. Obama’s perceived racialized and gendered radicalism; she, as 
a Black woman, was perceived to be “angry and unpatriotic” during 
the 2008 campaign.137  Significantly, the cover portrayed Mrs. Obama’s 
perceived radicalism as a co-extension of her husband’s perceived 
radicalism and otherness cultivated by external perceptions that he is 
a Muslim terrorist and is not an American citizen.138  However, in lieu 
of portraying Mrs. Obama as a woman who shares the same religious 
(and quite possibly racial) identity as her husband—which would have 
likely been signified by her caricature donning gendered religious at-
tire like a hijab—the cover specifically locates Mrs. Obama’s per-
ceived radicalism within her identification as a Black American wom-
an who is not Muslim.  Mrs. Obama’s afro in contrast to her typically 
conservative, straightened hairstyle, much like a Muslim woman’s hi-
jab, is a raced and gendered marker that is essential to the characteri-
zation of her as a rebellious and disloyal other who repudiates Ameri-
can values and thus, a violent threat to American security. 
Indeed, Muslim women’s headscarves and Black women’s natu-
rally textured hair have been searched at airport security checkpoints 
as a security measure.139  According to a Black woman, whose naturally 
textured hair placed in a bun atop of her head was searched by a TSA 
agent in a Seattle airport, felt that this search not only infringed upon 
her personal space but also constituted an act of racial discrimination, 
as TSA agents did not search other women whose straightened hair 
was in a similar hair bun or ponytail nor was the search of her hair 
conducted pursuant to a formal policy.140  A Muslim female attorney 
wearing a hijab also recounted her feeling of being the victim of dis-
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crimination: she was subjected to extra security searches in airports—
on both legs of her trip—and during one leg while standing in the se-
curity queue, a security guard pointed at her and yelled, “Scarf!”.141 
Afterwards, she informed her husband that she rather drive 25 hours 
than fly to Yellowstone National Park for an upcoming family vaca-
tion because she simply was not prepared to “go through [the] emo-
tional humiliation [she suffered] again.”142 Similarly, another Muslim 
woman claimed that she felt “violated,” “upset,” “offended,” and “har-
assed” by incessant, intimidating demands by National Guard person-
nel that she remove her hijab during an airport security search—even 
after she explained she could not take off her hijab in public in ac-
cordance with her religious beliefs.143 
Black women’s natural hairstyles and Muslim women’s hijabs 
have been politicized and denigrated and thus have served as a site of 
subordination, exclusion, and marginalization within personal and 
professional relationships,144 and in private and public spaces, like 
schools, airports, and workplaces, compelling Black and Muslim wom-
en to make a difficult decision not to wear a natural hairstyle and not 
to cover their hair in order to avoid negative social and economic re-
percussions145 that may result in “spirit injury.”146  Yet, distinctively Mus-
lim women (and those who are perceived as Muslim) are often faced 
with the choice of wearing a headscarf so as to avoid physical injury 
and violence.  Some Muslim women are simply afraid of wearing any 
type of religious head covering because of the possibility of being vio-
lently attacked.  On September 11th, 2001, in Brooklyn, New York, 
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rocks were hurled at two Muslim women, and days later a woman 
from Pakistan who donned a scarf was physically attacked in Florida.147   
Professor Aziz also details countless examples of Muslim women 
and those perceived to be Muslim encountering “palpable discrimina-
tion in employment and public spaces [post-9/11 . . . which have com-
pelled Muslim women] to remove the headscarf [in order] to be free 
from physical harassment, obtain gainful employment, and meaning-
fully participate in civic life.”148  Across the country, Muslim women 
who don headscarves have suffered violent physical attacks, sexual 
harassment, death threats, in addition to religious and racial epithets 
in open spaces, like neighborhood streets, gas stations, and college 
campuses.149  Some of these instances of extreme verbal and physical 
abuse Muslim women have suffered have also occurred in front of 
their children and anti-Muslim sentiment has been imputed onto the 
children whose mothers don a hijab, resulting in significant levels of 
bullying, harassment, and terrorization of Muslim children at school.150  
In addition to these acts of racial and religious violence, state courts 
and state court judges in various parts of the country have excluded 
Muslim women who wear a hijab; in fact, one African American Mus-
lim woman was held in contempt of court and sentenced to ten days in 
jail for refusing to remove her hijab upon the judge’s order.151  Conse-
quently, the capricious enforcement of “no hats” policies, which ex-
clude religious head coverings, likewise implicate Muslim women who 
are court employees and Muslim women who are performing their 
work, educational, and civic responsibilities in the courts like litigants, 
attorneys, law students, and jurors. 
In light of the actual and potential threats to their (as well as 
their children’s) emotional, spiritual, and physical being, livelihoods, 
and mortality, Muslim women who don hijabs are subject to indiscrim-
inate acts of disrespect and disregard for their humanity in public, so-
cial spaces. This leaves Muslim women uniquely vulnerable in con-
ducting their daily lives—a kind of vulnerability Black women wear-
ing natural hairstyles generally do not experience.  Therefore, despite 
the relative legal privilege Muslim women may hold with respect to 
donning a religious head covering, Black women possess a relative 
social privilege in their ability and freedom to wear natural hairstyles.  
Nonetheless, it should not be discounted that both Black and Muslim 
                                                                                                                           
 147 See Mohamed Nimer, Muslims in America After 9-11, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 1, 19 
(2002). 
 148 See generally Aziz, supra note 33, at 239. 
 149 See id. at 245-53.  
 150 See id. at 251-53.  
 151 See id. 
2013] A Multidimensional Analysis on What Not to Wear 363 
women may experience “daily microaggressions, rude behavior, dis-
missive statements, or outright disrespect [because of their hairstyles 
and head coverings which] [c]umulatively, [ . . . can] have adverse con-
sequences on [their] well-being.”152 
Furthermore, as GEO Group, Rogers, and Pitts illustrate, the de-
nial or termination of employment across industry type as well as the 
deprivation of equal conditions and privileges in the workplace are 
real and not conjectural for Black women who wear natural hairstyles 
and Muslim women who wear hijabs. Indeed, these are not isolated 
incidences.153 Accordingly, the journey for Black and Muslim women 
uniquely converge, as both Black and Muslim women are left to seri-
ously (and legitimately) deliberate whether to don natural hairstyles 
and hijabs respectively and a Black Muslim women who wears a hijab 
and a natural hairstyle may contemplate whether to don either or 
both. The next section, therefore, briefly proposes legal and advocacy 
interventions to address and redress the intersecting and compound-
ing discrimination that Black and Muslim women may suffer due to 
the imposition of arbitrary grooming codes barring natural hairstyles 
and/or hijabs in the workplace. 
V.  A CALL FOR LEGAL AND CROSS-CULTURAL COALITION 
ADVOCACY 
Though many commentators have observed that courts have in-
terpreted antidiscrimination law in such a constricted manner that 
numerous gaps and inefficiencies exist within the legal protection 
against race, gender, and religious discrimination in the workplace,154 
continued advocacy to amend the law and its interpretation is not a 
futile endeavor.  Increased awareness and advocacy within civil rights 
organizations concerning the limited and nonexistent protections for 
women of color wearing natural hairstyles or religious head coverings 
in the workplace are likewise needed.  Therefore, this article briefly 
contemplates how the plain language of Title VII and civil rights ad-
vocacy can be utilized more effectively to address the differential 
treatment, exclusion, and stigmatization that Black women donning 
natural hair and Muslim women donning hijabs encounter when em-
ployers ban or regulate how they adorn their hair.  
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Generally, Title VII cases involving Black women’s challenges 
against workplace prohibitions against natural hairstyles, a hybrid dis-
parate treatment/disparate impact framework. In Title VII cases chal-
lenging workplace prohibitions against Muslim women donning hijabs, 
a religious accommodation framework is generally appropriated.155  
GEO Group, Rogers, and Pitts illustrate, however, the implementation 
of grooming codes cannot always be neatly packaged as independent 
issues of intentional discrimination, unintentional discrimination, or 
organizational necessity.  Rather, the imposition of workplace groom-
ing codes can simultaneously disproportionately impact or unequally 
burden156 individuals on the basis of proscribed characteristics and can 
be motivated by the consideration of proscribed characteristics.  Addi-
tionally, grooming codes constitute express and informal barriers to 
acquiring and maintaining employment across industry and organiza-
tion type, often implemented without any correlation to job perfor-
mance or qualification.  Therefore, conceptualizing the aforemen-
tioned discrimination claims initiated by Black and Muslim women 
through the prism of singular, isolated analytical frameworks does not 
fully capture the deprivation of employment opportunities regardless 
of industry type as well as unequal conditions and privileges of em-
ployment that Black and Muslim women suffer due to the enforce-
ment of arbitrary grooming codes.  
Plaintiff-side employment lawyers and judges should, therefore, 
enhance the meaning of Title VII’s plain language by viewing these 
prohibitions against, and regulation of, Black women’s natural hair-
styles and Muslim women’s donning of a hijab as a violation of section 
703(a)(2) which makes it unlawful for a covered employer to “limit, 
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in 
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities [. . .] because of such individual’s race, col-
or religion, sex, or national origin.”157  Professor Sandra Sperino 
acknowledges in her article, Rethinking Discrimination, that  
some courts have gone so far as to state that [703(a)(2)] of Title 
VII’s operative language relates to disparate impact, while 
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[703(a)(1)] relates to disparate treatment.  Such thinking is not 
required by the operative language of the federal employment 
discrimination statutes, but flows from the ways in which the 
courts [and employment discrimination lawyers] think about dis-
crimination frameworks.158 
Accordingly, “[Section 703(a)(2)] only requires that the terms or con-
ditions of plaintiff’s employment were affected or that the [employ-
er’s] conduct did or tended to deprive a plaintiff of employment op-
portunities [on the basis of Title VII’s proscribed grounds.]”159  
The previous analysis of GEO Group, Rogers, and Pitts demon-
strates that grooming codes prohibiting hijabs and natural hairstyles in 
fact deprive Muslim and Black women from employment for which 
they are qualified on the basis of race, religion, and gender.  Close 
scrutiny of these three cases also reveals the parallel forms of subor-
dinating, stigmatizing, exclusionary, and differential treatment that 
Black and Muslim women experience in tandem with management’s 
implementation of grooming codes because of their intersecting iden-
tities.  Black, Muslim women may also endure such discrimination in 
the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment and deprivation of 
employment on the basis of race, religion, and gender if an employer 
prohibits both hijabs and natural hairstyles.  Based upon a pure appli-
cation of Section 703(a)(2) to the factual circumstances underlying 
challenges against grooming codes that bar hijabs and natural hair-
styles, such appearance standards violate Title VII’s express proscrip-
tions against race, religion, and gender discrimination. 
Though courts often view these grooming codes as harmless acts 
of employer prerogative, multidimensional and intersectional analyses 
of workplace grooming codes banning and regulating natural hair-
styles and hijabs delineate that employers’ implementation and en-
forcement of these mandates arbitrarily deprive or tend to deprive 
Black women and Muslim women acquisition and maintenance of 
employment for which they are qualified in violation of Title VII’s 
plain language.  In order to obtain or maintain employment, Black and 
Muslim women’s conformity with such exclusionary workplace 
grooming mandates may in effect require their compliance with ex-
press and implicit forms of gender-based subordination and differen-
tial treatment in the workplace to which other women and men are 
not subject. Civil rights and workers’ rights constituencies, therefore, 
should begin to address the myriad consequences of workplace bans 
                                                                                                                           
 158 Sperino, supra note 154, at 101-02.  
 159 Id. at 97.  
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against hijabs and natural hairstyles through meaningful coalition 
building and advocacy efforts. 
Viewing these grooming codes cases through a multidimensional 
lens illuminates the individual and collective harm of employers’ 
seemingly innocuous implementation and enforcement of grooming 
codes implicating Black and Muslim women’s hair.  Uniquely, Black 
and Muslim women experience economic and stigmatic injury due to 
employment conditions that moderate and exclude their presence—
via their hair—from private workplaces, regardless of the industry or 
organization type. Indeed, workplace regulations banning hijabs and 
naturally textured hairstyles may doubly affect women of color who 
are both Muslim and Black and don hijabs and natural hair. Conse-
quently, granting indefinite power to private employers to specifically 
regulate the hair of women of color may not simply reify but also am-
plify their exclusion from the workplace and corresponding social, 
economic, political and legal disadvantage at the intersection of race, 
religion, and sex.  Thus, contemporary civil rights and workers’ rights 
discourse and advocacy efforts that challenge workplace grooming 
codes banning Black women and Muslim women from wearing natu-
ral hairstyles and hijabs in the workplace should be developed in such 
a way that the intersecting and exclusive interests of Black and Mus-
lim women are neither marginalized nor privileged. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In its multidimensional analysis of grooming codes prohibiting 
and regulating the ways in which Black women can don natural hair-
styles and Muslim women can don a hijab in the workplace, this article 
aims to highlight the distinctive and interactive nature of these work-
place conditions affecting women of color.  In so doing, this article 
points out that though Muslim women may possess a greater legal 
privilege and right to wear a hijab in the workplace than Black women 
who don natural hairstyles, one woman’s relative legal privilege does 
not override the similar vulnerability, disempowerment, stigmatiza-
tion, exclusion, and corresponding differential treatment with respect 
to the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment that Black and 
Muslim women uniquely experience in the workplace.  Furthermore, 
Black Muslim women may be subjected to a double form of exclusion 
if an employer bans both hijabs and natural hairstyles in the work-
place.   
Accordingly, the journeys of Black and Muslim women overlap in 
ways that are not often acknowledged and appreciated by law and 
society. This article calls for jurists, practitioners, and civil and workers’ 
rights advocates to fully recognize the interconnectedness of the expe-
rience of these women of color.  This article submits that these con-
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stituencies not only enhance the meaning of Title VII’s plain language 
but also engage in cross-cultural coalition discourse and advocacy ef-
forts so that the multidimensional experiences of women of color who 
don hijabs and natural hairstyles—in the workplace and beyond—are 
meaningfully addressed. In this vein, this article argues that more sub-
stantive protection for Muslim women who don hijabs and actual pro-
tection for Black women who don natural hairstyles should and can be 
provided under contemporary antidiscrimination law and doctrine. 
 
